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Abstract 
his Master-thesis assesses the possible difficulties that surround the 
implementation of EU directives into the legal systems of the EU member 
states. The aim of the thesis is twofold. Firstly, It introduces a structural 
framework that is able to structure the analysis of implementation in the European 
Union. It starts from the premise that the EU can be studied as if it was a 
Federation. The framework builds upon the division in selected actors and factors 
that have a stake in implementation problems. Subsequently, selected concepts 
from the Europeanization and Implementation theory are added to augment the 
explanatory strength of the framework. Moreover, underlying can and will 
problems found in a detailed literature and empirical research are used in the last 
stage of the framework; the compliance with EU directives. The preliminary 
application of the structural framework upon two empirical case-studies of 
Germany and The Netherlands seems to indicate that the aggregate framework is 
able to structure the study of implementation problems on the supranational, 
national and local level. Secondly, the aim of the thesis is to answer the question 
which of the actors and factor are involved in the majority of implementation 
problems. This study shows that across all EU levels the decentralized character 
of enforcement by the Commission, the constitutional set up of a member state, 
the content of a directive the adequate technical and scientific infrastructure in 
place on national level, shifting national interests, the room for national 
bureaucracies to decide on policy details and strong domestic pressure are the 
most explanatory problems found inherent to the actors and factors studied.  
 
Key words: EU directives, Implementation, Compliance, Europeanization, 
Implementation theory.  
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Figure 1. Proposed Structural Framework for analyzing EU directive 
implementation problems. By: Pieterjan Rozenberg.  
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I Introduction1 
 
1.1 The subject of the study 
 
very year the institutions of the European Union (EU) reaches hundreds of 
decisions in various policy areas where it possesses the relevant 
competences. The EU can hence be called a law-intensive organisation. 
The majority of these laws which are decided upon by the European Council and 
the European Parliament, on the initiation of the European Commission need to 
be implemented into national legislation, in order to produce their full effects.  
Implementation is, like the rest of the European Union, somewhat sui generis. 
Implementation of EU directives forms the end stage of the EU policy making 
process and is a significant part of this policy process. It may therefore be 
wondered why do member states whose interests seem not to be neglected in the 
policy formulation fail to transpose and implement correctly EU legislation?2 
  Late and faulty implementation is problematic because it endangers the 
credibility and the effectiveness of EC law. In the words of former Internal 
Market Commissioner Bolkestein, ‘Delays in putting directives into effect cause 
enormous harm to business and to citizens.’3 The correct implementation of EU 
law is indispensable for the effective working of Community law, i.e. the same 
laws should be applicable in the same and consistent manner throughout the EU.  
In addition from a political science perspective, implementation has become what 
Pressman and Wildavsky call a ‘decision point’, where clarification is required for 
the implementation of the policy embodied in a directive.4 During the European 
Council in Stockholm in 2001, the member states agreed that the backlog in the 
implementation of EU directives should not be more than 1.5% of the total of all 
directives in force5, however as the monitor results of the Commission for 2006 
show, many member states are not able to fulfil this promise.6 However, it seems 
that for 2007, the results are slightly better.  
Within this study of the implementation of EU regulations into member 
states, the directive is the central. The directive is one of the main instruments of 
harmonization used by the Community institutions to bring together or co-
ordinate the disparate laws of the Member States in various fields. Directives are 
                                                 
1
 I am very grateful to Professor Ole Elgström of the department of Political Science at Lund University, Sweden 
who has helped me with advice and supported me in order to reach this end result.  
2
 M. Mendiou, ‘Non compliance and the European Commission’s role in integration,’ in: Journal of European 
Public Policy, 3, 1, 1-22 (1996) p 8.  
3
 European Commission, 2004, Internal Market Report: Big disparities between member states in implementing 
and applying results. IP/04/33, 12 January 2004. p 52. 
4
 J.Pressman and A. Wildavsky, ‘Implementation. How Great Expectations in Washington are Dashed in 
Oakland, 3rd edition. (University of Calfornia Press, 1984). P 24.  
5
 Bernard Steunenberg en W. Voermans, ‘De Omzetting van Europese Richtlijnen: Instrumenten, technieken en 
processen in zes lidstaten vergeleken. Report for Dutch ministry of Justice. (Leiden 2005) P 35-36.  
6
 See European Commission tables in the appendix number 7.1 on page 41.  
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binding as to the end to be achieved, but it leaves some choice as to form and 
method open to the Member States.7 However, member states have the task to 
implement a directive in time and correct, in order to avoid discrepancies between 
community law and national law. Under article 226 of the EC Treaty the 
European Commission is given the right to initiate infringement procedures 
against member states that have not succeed in implementation correctly and in 
time. The proceedings of the infringement are specified in Figure 7.2 at page 42 
of the Appendix.  
 
1.2 The Purpose of the Study 
The complexity of the implementation process causes that the European Union 
frequently encounters considerable problems with the implementation of 
directives. The aim of this paper is bipartite. The first aim is (1) to construct a 
structural framework for the analysis of implementation problems in the 
European Union policy process. The second aim is (2) to draw a cautious 
conclusion as to which of the actors and factors studied are pivotal in the causes 
of implementation problems in the European Union. The purpose of the 
framework is to structure the analysis of the problems that can arise in the 
implementation process of EU directives. Were most studies focus on one or a 
couple of actors on either the domestic or the supranational level, an attempt will 
here be made to develop a framework that is able to analyze the problems that can 
arise around the implementation of EU directives. From the moment a EU 
directive is decided upon after European level negotiations, to the moment where 
the European Commission and European Court of Justice (ECJ) have to step in 
and use their power to ensure compliance with an EU directive by a member state.  
The structural framework endeavours to emphasize the fact that causes of 
implementation problems can be found and analyzed on both the domestic and 
supranational level. The structural framework that will be proposed in this thesis 
will make use of existing theoretical concepts, taken from the Implementation, 
Europeanization and Compliance theory and a distinction will be put central 
between selected actors and factors that are central in analyzing implementation 
problems in the European Union. Recall figure 1 at page 5 for a graphical 
reflection of the in this thesis proposed structural framework.  
 
         1.3 The Method and Material of the Study  
 
The research design of the thesis is constituted in the following way; After having 
introduced the structural framework in chapter one, in chapter two the actor and 
factor component of the framework will be studied in a study of the existing 
implementation-literature. Sources of implementation problems that according to 
the literature can arise during the implementation process will be categorized 
under the respective actors and factors. Subsequently, an provisional empirical 
study in chapter three will investigate to what extent the problems discerned from 
                                                 
7
 Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, ‘EU Law, text, cases and materials’ (Oxford 2003) p 114. 
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the literature research can also be found empirically in the process of the 
implementation of the Water Framework directive 2000/60/EC in Germany and 
the Netherlands. With the insights from these two studies the remainder and the 
applicability of the structural framework will in chapter five be discussed Finally, 
in the conclusion an answer will be given to the two central research questions.  
          The analysis will be based firstly upon academic political science 
literature, but use will also be made off legal material in order to shed light on the 
legal dynamics that form the fundament of the implementation and compliance 
process. Secondly, for the empirical study extensive use will be made of German 
and Dutch primary sources, to be able to get detailed information on the 
implementation of directive 2000/60/EC. Joined together, both primary and 
secondary literature are able to answer the two central research questions.  
 
In sum, the EU implementation-process is definitely a fascinating, although 
somewhat ignored part of the EU decision making process. It is crucial in the 
European integration project. The member states, with the help and pressure of 
the Commission and European Court of Justice, are responsible for the correct 
and in time implementation of EU directives and for law abiding to these 
directives afterwards. Implementation is the moment Without a strong attention 
for implementation, the EU-project runs the risk of being delayed and 
marginalized. Therefore, big interests are at stake in EU implementation and this 
paper would like to underline this importance.  
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II Theoretical Concepts on 
Implementation in the European Union  
 
 
 
 
he EU being ‘un object politique non-identifié’ it will be attempted in this 
chapter to develop a structural framework, that is able to study problems 
with the implementation of directives in the European Union in a 
structured manner. The framework tries to combine an ‘actor and factor 
distinction’ on the one side with concepts from both the Implementation theory 
and the Europeanization approach on the other side. The framework starts with 
the assumption that the implementation of EU directives in the European Union 
can be analyzed as if it was a federal polity. The main reason for this is when this 
has been proven, federal implementation theory can be applied. However, it is not 
a straightforward procedure to apply (federal) implementation theory on the EU, 
as the EU does as yet not constitute a state. A graphical representation of the 
structural framework can be found on page [5]. 
 
 
2.1 The European Union as a Federal Polity. 
What differentiates a federation from an unitary system is the fact that there is 
constitutional and political status of lower-level governments in relation to central 
authorities. The EU is highly decentralized and federal arrangements can be said 
to be present when ‘the principle of the division of powers between centre and 
regions is established constitutionally, and citizens hold an identity at both 
levels.’8 The application of the theory of regulatory federalism, developed by 
Kelemen, on the European Union confirms the notion that the EU can be analysed 
as a federal state.  
          Kelemen states that ‘regulatory federalism’ is an institutional arrangement 
that divides the public authority to establish and implement regulatory policy 
between one ‘federal’ and two more ‘state’ governments.9 A system of regulatory 
federalism should have three basic attributes. Firstly, ‘two regulators.’ The system 
is divided in two primary levels of government, a federal and a state level. Both 
levels have the authority to regulate economic activity, however the federal 
government can do this for the whole system, the state governments only for their 
own jurisdictions.  Secondly, there exists a ‘common market’. The group of states 
which together form a federation have agreed among themselves (for example in a 
constitution or treaty) to establish free interstate commerce. Thirdly, there should 
exist what Kelemen calls ‘High Court Adjudication’. In this situation both the 
                                                 
8
 McKay, David., ‘Designing Europe – Comparative Lessons from the Federal Experience. (Oxford 2001)  p 20.  
9
 R. Daniel Kelemen, ‘Regulatory federalism, EU environmental regulation in comparative perspective,’ in: 
Journal of Public Policy (2000) Vol. 20,  p 136. 
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federal and state governments recognize a high court to be the ultimate arbiter of 
disputes between them 
  To come back to the matter of implementation of directives in federal 
states Kelemn notes that leaving implementation of federal regulations in the 
hands of state governments inevitably leads to uneven implementation. When 
states have different preferences than the federal government, they also take 
different approaches to implementation. Therefore, Kelemen states, ‘a division of 
competences persists in which the federal government is primarily responsible for 
policy making, while state governments are primarily responsible for policy 
implementation.10 The theory of regulatory federalism therefore provides useful 
conceptions in order to analyze the implementation of EU directives. 
 
From the European level the framework descends to the domestic level. The actor 
and factor are the central analyzing mechanisms in the framework. In the 
framework the analysis of influence of the five actors, descending from 
supranational to domestic, on implementation problems and the factors form a 
central aspect of the framework.11 The analysis is modelled in a X → Y research. 
Here, Y = implementation problems with directives in the European Union. I 
assume that certain actors (X¹ to X²) have a stake or influence in these problems. 
These are (X2) The European Commission. (X2) The European Court of Justice. 
(X3) National Governments. (X4) Bureaucracy in the Member States. (X5) 
Interest Groups on the Domestic Level. These actors will be systematically 
investigated and it will be attempted to explain their individual influence. 
However, with the focus only on actors the analysis would loose its explanatory 
strength, unless the relevant factors would be analysed as well. Factors can be the 
capacity of national administrations to implement a new directive, the 
characteristics of a particular directive itself or the policy area in which the 
directive tries to introduce new rules. In chapter three the actors and factors are 
further  introduced and analyzed. In the remainder of this chapter, the other 
theoretical concepts of the structural framework will currently be discussed.  
 
2.2 Theoretical Concepts at the Domestic level – 
Implementation Failure explained 
 
2.2.1  Theoretical Concept #1 ‘Goodness of Fit’ 
The first concept that will be introduced in the framework is ‘the goodness of fit 
argument’ advanced by Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso. The goodness of fit is one 
of the central aspects in the Europeanization literature and it stresses the upon the 
‘fit’ between EU level processes, policies, and institutions and those found at the 
domestic level.12 The main idea is that Europeanization matters only if there is 
                                                 
10
 R. Daniel Kelemen, ‘Regulatory federalism, EU environmental regulation in comparative perspective,’ in: 
Journal of Public Policy (2000) Vol. 20,  p137-138.  
11
 Recall the graphic of the structural framework on page 5.  
12
 Thomas König, Brooke Leutgert and Lars Mäder, ‘Troubles with timelines: explaining trends in transposition 
delay,’ (2005) p 7.  
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divergence, incompatibility, or ‘misfit’ between European level institutional 
processes, politics and policies, and the domestic level. In order to produce 
domestic effects, EU policy must be somewhat difficult to absorb at the domestic 
level.13 Radaelli states that when adjustment pressure is low, because the content 
of EU policy is already present in a member state, there is no need to change 
domestic institutions. Simply, because there exist a good fit between national 
policy and the EU policy. On the other side, when the distance between EU 
policies and national ones is very high, member states will find it very difficult to 
implement the European policy.14 However, one should be careful not to conclude 
that goodness is a encompassing explanation for the Europeanization of domestic 
institutions. Factors like bureaucratic structures, corporatist or pluralist style of 
decision making, the centralization or decentralization of power are often also 
indispensable.15 Börzel and Risse present a testable goodness of fit hypothesis. 
They argue: ‘The lower the compatibility between European and domestic 
processes, policies, and institutions, the higher the adjustment pressure.’  
 
2.2.2 Theoretical Concept #2 ‘Communication model of Inter-
Governmental Policy Implementation’ 
 
The Communication model developed by M.L. Goggin in 199016 is the second 
concept introduced in the framework. This American based model is largely 
pointed to a federal system. It endeavours to construct a model for the analysis of 
implementation, with a strong emphasis upon what affects the acceptance or 
rejection of messages between layers of government. See Figure 7.317 for a 
graphical sketch of this model. The underlying conceptualization is the 
intergovernmental policy making as an ‘implementation subsystem full of 
messages, messengers, channels, and targets operating within a broader 
communications system.18 State-level implementers form in this constellation the 
connection for communications coming from both national and local level 
senders. The Communication model discerns two independent variables. Firstly, 
the federal level inducements and constraints (coming from ‘the top’) and 
secondly, the state- and local level inducements and constraints (coming from ‘the 
bottom’). The federal, state, and local inducements and constraints impact a 
state’s decisional outcome, as well its capacity to act. The decision of the state 
decision makers to act is influenced by their perception of the messages flowing 
from the federal, state and local levels. The capacity of a state to act is of great 
                                                 
13
 Simon J. Bulmer and Claudio M. Radaelli, The Europeanization of National Policy. In: The Member States of 
the European Union (Oxford 2005) p 346.  
14
 Claudio M. Radaelli, The Europeanization of Public Policy. In: Kevin Featherstone en Claudio Radaelli (eds) 
The politics of Europeanization. (2003) p 44-45.  
15
 Ibidem., p 45.  
16
 M.L Goggin et al., Implementation Theory and Practice: Toward a third generation. (1990).  
17
 Michael Hill and Peter Hupe, implementing public policy (London 2003). p 67. 
18
 Kurt D. Cline, Defining the implementation problem: organizational management versus cooperation. In: 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory July 2000; 10, 3. p 554.  
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influence of a state’s ability to perform in compliance with a national mandate.19 
Subsequently there are two intervening variables. Firstly, organizational capacity. 
This is the structure, personnel and financial resources of a state. Secondly, 
ecological capacity. This is the environment wherein a state government operates, 
for example the state’s economic, political, and situational capacity.20 The central 
aspect of this model is the communication between the federal, state, and local 
level of the government. It sees national policy as ‘federal messages.’ Goggin 
states that ‘state implementation behaviour is a function of inducements and 
constraints provided to or imposed on the states from elsewhere in the federal 
system, above or below the state level, as well as of the state’s own propensity to 
act and its capacity to effectuate its preferences.’21 
 
2.2.3 Theoretical concept # 3 ‘Degree of Domestic Change’  
Constituting the third theoretical concept absorbed in the framework, domestic 
change will occur in the case that an EU directive contains a significantly 
different set of policy concepts than that already existed in national laws. This 
was shown in the discussion of the ‘Goodness of fit’ approach. The degree of 
domestic change in response to this Europeanization can however vary greatly. 
Börzel and Risse discern three degrees of domestic change. Firstly, there can be 
question of absorption. In this case Member States will incorporate European 
policies or ideas into their domestic structure. However, the policy coming from 
the EU level will not greatly change the national processes and policy in place. 
The domestic change will therefore be small. Secondly, the adoption and 
implementation of an EU directive can lead to accommodation, where EU policies 
will be accommodated into existing national structures. Also here the underlying 
principles will not change. For example the policy can change, but the institutions 
will stay the same. The domestic change will be modest. Thirdly, an EU directive 
can lead to a transformation where member states replace existing policies, 
processes and institutions by new, highly different ones. Here, the degree of 
domestic change is very high.22 
 
2.2.4 Concept # 4 Can versus Will Concept.  
So far, consequences from either the deeds of certain actors or the influence of 
certain factors have been assigned. As will be introduced in this thesis, it is useful 
to not only ascribe the cause of certain implementation difficulties to an actor, 
factor or a combination of both, but also to classify whether the causes have a 
voluntarily or involuntarily background. Discerning the voluntary or involuntary 
character of the implementation deficit of a particular member state is highly 
important for the Commission in selecting the right mechanism to ensure 
                                                 
19
 Kurt D. Cline, Defining the implementation problem: organizational management versus cooperation. In: 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory July 2000; 10, 3. p 554. 
20
 Ibidem., P 554.  
21
 M.L Goggin et al., Implementation Theory and Practice: Toward a third generation. (1990) p 31.  
22
 Börzel and Risse, Conceptualizing the domestic impact in: Kevin Featherstone en Claudio Radaelli (eds.) The 
politics of Europeanization. (2003)  P 71.  
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compliance. This is also the core of the compliance literature. However, the line 
between can and will is rather thin. It can be stated that most of the causes of 
problems of actors can be ascribed as voluntarily decisions. The Commission’s 
decision to strike a political deal with a member state is obviously voluntarily, but 
the problems arising from the principle of decentralized enforcement of the 
Commission has a more involuntary connotation. However, most of the factors 
can be framed as involuntarily actions. A member state chooses not voluntarily to 
have a low level of GDP or a modest level of consensus in its society. For the 
following discussion of the third stage of the framework it is indispensable to 
have a mechanism to categorize an implementation problem as being of voluntary 
or involuntary nature.  
 
2.3 Theoretical Concepts at the EU level– ensuring 
compliance with EU directives.  
 
Within the European Integration literature, several scholars have attempted to 
analyze and theorize the law abiding by member states. Compliance means not 
only the on-time and correct implementation of directives and regulations, but 
also the avoidance of non-compliance with already existing directives, regulations 
and the EC Treaties. Within the EU institutional set-up the main focus of this 
research is on the European Commission and the ECJ and their involvement of 
the compliance of internal market law. With this the circle is round and we are 
back at the Kelemen theory of the regulatory state. Herein are the two primary 
levels of government; the European Commission (together with the European 
Council) and the National Governments. Is the ‘High Court Adjudication’ the ECJ 
and lastly there exists also a common market.  
 
2.3.1 The Enforcement approach 
This approach assumes that the member states of the European Union have 
defection incentives and that states violate voluntarily international norms and 
rules. The reason is that they do not want to bear the costs of compliance. The 
enforcement approach therefore states that compliance problems are best solved 
by increasing the likelihood and costs of detection through monitory and the threat 
of sanctions.23 Haas states: even if a state may believe that signing a treaty is in its 
best interest, the political calculations associated with the subsequent decision 
actually to comply with international agreements are distinct and quite 
different.’24 Non compliance can also have an economic cause, in that member 
states do not comply because compliance is distributing scarce resources that 
could be put to alternative uses. Transparency is increased with monitoring, and 
                                                 
23
 Jonas Tallberg, ‘Paths to compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union,’ in: International 
Organization, Vol. 56, No 3. (2002) p 611.  
24
 Peter M. Haas, ‘Compliance with EU directives: insights from International Relations and Comparative 
Politics,’ in: Journal of European Public Policy 1998 p 19.  In; Jonas Tallberg, ‘Paths to Compliance.’ 
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sanctions raise the costs for member states of non-compliance. Together, 
monitoring and sanctions carry the capacity of deterring defections and 
compelling compliance.25 The effectiveness of the enforcement approach varies 
with the level of behavioural changes required by a directive. However, non 
compliance or free riding becomes less attractive to states the more likely they are 
to get caught and punished.26 
 
2.3.2 The Management approach.  
The management approach departs from a very different assumption about the 
reasons for the non- compliance of a member state. Börzel states about the 
management approach: ‘States are in principle willing to comply with 
international rules to which they once agreed.’27 In this approach, non compliance 
is conceived as a problem of ‘involuntary’ defection. Tallberg notes that the 
management approach assumes that capacity limitations and rule ambiguity are 
the reasons for non-compliance.28 However, instead of punishing the member 
states for this caused non-compliance, the management approach stresses the 
importance of capacity building an rule specification. The Commission is in place 
non only to monitor and sanction, but also to provide financial and technical 
assistance for member states with weak implementation capacities.29 Chayes and 
Chayes also state that ‘if we are correct that the principal source of non 
compliance is not wilful disobedience but the lack of capability or clarity or 
priority, then coercive enforcement is as misguided as it is costly.30 The 
management approach states that the mechanisms of rule interpretation need to be 
formal adjudication in international courts; informal and non-binding meditative 
processes can also clarify treaty rules. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 Jonas Tallberg, ‘Paths to compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union,’ in: International 
Organization, Vol. 56, No 3. (2002) p 612.  
26
 Tanja A. Börzel, ‘Guarding the treaty: The Compliance Strategies of the European Commission,’ in The State 
of the European Union Vol 6.: Law, Politcs and Soceity (Oxford 2003) p 199. 
27
 Ibidem., p 200.  
28
  Jonas Tallberg, ‘Paths to compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union,’ in: International 
Organization, Vol. 56, No 3. (2002) p 613.  
29
 Tanja A. Börzel, ‘Guarding the treaty: The Compliance Strategies of the European Commission,’ in The State 
of the European Union Vo.l 6.: Law, Politcs and Soceity (Oxford 2003) p 200.  
30
 Chayes and Chayes, The New Sovereignty- Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (Cambridge 
1995) p 22.  
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III Literature Research 
 
3.1 The European Commission – (X1) 
 
he analysis of the selected actors and factors start in this section with the role and 
influence of the European Commission on the process implementation with EU 
directives. The Commission is not a monolithic bloc, but can be discerned into 
two parts. The ‘College of Commissioners’ and the ‘Commission’s services.’31 If political 
and administrative tasks could be disentangled, the College would be responsible for 
politics and the services for administration. It is the latter that has the focus in this 
section. The services have always been small in size compared with national 
administrations. The reason for this is that the Commission itself rarely implements EU 
policies, an activity that requires a large number of civil servants. It collect and asses data 
through ‘in-house’ monitoring on whether the European law is properly applied and 
enforced in the member state.32 Since this function is labour intensive and time 
consuming, the Commission depends for this function also heavily on the national 
implementation authorities as its own sources are relatively limited.33 
          The EC Treaty delegates the competence to the European Commission and the 
European Court of Justice to monitor and sanction non-compliance. The Commission 
shall according to Article 211 EC ‘ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the 
measures taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are applied.’ If the state concerned 
does not comply with the opinion of the Commission, it may bring the matter before the 
ECJ under Article 226 EC.34 In the different stages of the infringement procedure, see 
figure 7.2 in the appendix, the Commission act as the prosecutor and the ECJ as the 
judge. The Commission central task is to monitor compliance, when problems are 
discerned it sends a ‘Formal Letter’ to the concerning member state in which problems 
are stated and a request to the member state to give its own observations on the matter, 
with a deadline of two months. The formal letter is not part of the official proceedings, 
but is part of the preliminary stage that serves the purpose of information and 
consultation.35 It gives the member state the opportunity to get back in position without 
any further consequences. If a member states than still has not implemented the 
obligations of an EU directive, the Commission sends a ‘Reasoned Opinion’, which is the 
start of the official proceedings against a Member State. The Commission states in the 
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letter the legal justification for starting legal proceedings and detailed prove why the 
member state has infringed Community law and states a deadline for which the 
irregularities must be solved.36 The last stage in which the Commission has a stake is the 
‘Referral to the ECJ.’ This is the last means if a member state is persistent in its non- 
implementation.37  
          From the literature it is proven that the Commission will assist member states 
technically when a member state is in the process of implementing an EU directive but 
lacks the sufficient expertise and administrative resources necessary for a correct 
implementation. Börzel notes that ‘while the European Union has expanded its legislative 
competencies, the implementation and enforcement of European law firmly rests within 
the responsibility of the member states. Mbaye notes that the Commission has many 
programs that ‘help actors interpret policy, that extend aid to poor states, and that 
encourage cooperation.’ But, as Mbaye states, compliance problems remain.38  
          The Commission generally tries to avoid formal sanctions stage and prefers to 
negotiate39 and discuss the matter informally with the concerning member state. 
However, the Commission possess considerable discretion in deciding whether and when 
to open proceedings and to move from state of the infringement procedure to the next.40 
The Commission communicates with member governments and declares its readiness to 
use economic sanctions against them.41 When the Commission has send its first letters of 
notice the number of delays diminish generally very quickly. As Snyder remarks, it 
seems that negotiation and adjudication are two alternative forms of dispute settlement. 
But in the daily practice and working ideology of the Commission, the two mechanisms 
are complementary. Snyder states that the main form of dispute settlement used by the 
Commission is negotiation, and litigation is simply a part, sometimes inevitable, but 
generally a minor part, of this process.42  
          Dimitrakopoulos point out some critics on the Commission. It is sometimes seen 
‘as an unhelpful and occasionally unreliable source of assistance in the transposition 
stage.’43 It has been argued that the principle of decentralized enforcement of Community 
law leaves the Commission, which does not enjoy any direct political legitimization, in a 
weak and ‘invidious position.’ Mbaye remarks in another article that the Commission 
may act strategically when selecting cases that are to go before the ECJ.44 Börzel 
concludes that the Commission may treat some member states more carefully than others 
because they are more powerful; this can be because they contribute significantly to the 
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EU budget, have considerable voting power in the Council, or their population is very 
‘Eurosceptic’ and the Commission is careful to avoid upsetting public opinion in these 
member states by officially shaming them for non-compliance with Community law.45 
Susanne Schmidt notes that the Commission is in comparing to the ECJ much more 
restricted in its actions. The ECJ is independent, but the member states have various 
mechanisms at their disposal to control the Commission.  
           The Commission itself also has advantages by achieving good implementation 
records by the member states. Mastenbroek states that ‘Implementation problems put a 
drain on the Commission’s scarce time and personnel, because investigating instances of 
alleged late or incorrect implementation is cumbersome and time-consuming.’46 Having 
analyzed in this section on the functions the European Commission performs, a number 
of problems, inherent to the functions the Commission performs in the implementation 
and compliance process, have been discerned.  
 
3.2 The European Court of Justice – (X2)  
The second X under investigation here, is the European Court of Justice and its the role 
and the position in the implementation process of EU directives into national 
administrations. The analysis of the role of the ECJ has received less attention from 
political scientists and is largely confined to legal scholars. As has been shown in the 
previous section, the ECJ comes into play when the Commission has made the decision 
in the third stage of the infringement procedure to take a member state before the Court. 
In this stage the ECJ as the decisive arbitrator between the Commission on the one hand 
and the concerning member state on the other hand. 47 The EC Treaty sees a complaint at 
the Court as the ultimum remedum, a final measure.48 
           The role of the ECJ in the implementation process is stressed by numerous 
scholars. Tallberg for example states that ‘once a case has been referred to the ECJ, the 
room for bargaining (the preferred dispute settlement mechanism of the Commission) is 
significantly reduced. However, it happens that member states are becoming afraid with 
the prospect of a negative ECJ judgment. This possibility is very reasonable, as about 90 
percent of all infringement judgments are in favour of the Commission.49 Member states 
will transpose a directive to avoid further steps and the eventually a case before the ECJ, 
in which, as has been stated already, the chance that the ECJ will rule in favour of the 
Commission or other complainants is very large.50 The ECJ has started to impose 
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financial penalties on member states for failing to implement EU directives.51 It is clear 
from the literature that the ECJ has a threatening purpose. 
The literature names the infringement procedure, with the Court as final enforcer, 
effective.52 However, as is argued, implementation varieties still persist. We might 
conclude here, that this implicitly states that the Court is not effective or powerful enough 
to enforce correct and equal implementation. Apparently, other forces are also at work 
that hinder a correct and equal implementation of EU directives. Dimitrakopoulos points 
at the importance of the ECJ in implementation by pointing at the fact that institutions do 
not change easily. They often only adjust to external pressures, in this case the obligation 
to transpose EU law under the guidance of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice.53 
           Dimitrakopoulos also points at the fact that the jurisprudence has restricted the 
capacity of national authorities to utilize institutional autonomy in order to undermine 
implementation. Connected to this the Court has repeated that a state cannot invoke 
‘special circumstances’ for not implementing a certain directive. The reasoning here goes 
that the negotiations in the Council allows them ‘to asses the implications of a draft piece 
of EU legislation and to make the appropriate provisions.’54 Using the principle agent 
principle, as Tallberg does, the high degree of independency the ECJ possess to act 
against the preferences of its principals, the member states can be explained. He states 
that the Commission is ‘subject to participation based monitoring by national 
governments through the comitology system and that there is no such direct effect and 
intrusive monitoring in the Court’s decision making process.’55 The functioning of the 
European Court of Justice within the implementation and compliance stage has been 
analyzed in this section. It is an indispensable actor in enforcing the solving of 
implementation problems by member states.  
 
3.3 The National Governments- (X3)  
 
The third X under investigation are the National Governments. In this section the role of 
the national governments in implementation of EU directives will be investigated. As has 
become clear, the responsibility for the practical implementation of an EU directive rests 
largely with the Member States. For the purpose of implementing directives, as Giuseppe 
Ciavarini Azzi states, the member states could almost be regarded as ‘an extension of the 
Community institutions.56  
          The role of the national government is pivotal both in the ‘uploading’ and 
‘downloading’ process of an EU directive. The uploading process takes place during the 
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negotiations about an EU directive on the EU level between member states. The member 
states will try to get its preferences in the final provisions of the EU directive. With 
downloading is meant the process whereby EU directives are absorbed in the national 
administrations of the member states.57 Héritier states that member states seek to shape 
European policy-making according to their interests and domestic interests. At the same 
time they have to adjust their institutions to European legislation once the latter has been 
enacted.58  
           When applied on the EU as a federal system with two different levels of 
government (national and European) this concept suggests that the preference formation 
processes of the lower-level polity and the higher-level polity are clearly distinct.59 This 
concept predicts that when a certain member state has not been very successful on the 
European level to see its preferences back in an EU directive (the ‘uploading’ of its 
preferences), it will try to resist the implications of the EU directive during the 
implementation stage. Börzel points to another reason of problems in the downloading 
process. the state’s substantial interests and preferences might change over time, either 
because of domestic changes or because of environmental changes. Between the adoption 
and the implementation of a directive are often two to thee years. This provides 
incentives for defection and for non-compliant action as a consequence.   
           If changes do meanwhile occur in the specific policy field, this can create 
incentives for defection and for non-complaint action as a consequence. In situations 
where states have to cooperate, states often have an incentive to come back on their 
promised commitments. In the literature it is stated that member states sometimes gain 
often more from benefiting of the directive, without ‘putting in their own fair share’60 
Here we touch upon the problem of free riding. Dimitrikapolous states that how EU law 
is actually transposed in the member states is largely determined by national 
constitutional rules.61 The principle of institutional autonomy is hereby important. This is 
the right of the member states to perform the tasks that stem from membership of the EU 
on the basis of their own constitutional rules, stated in article 249 EC.62  
           Generally, if a government can ensure an atmosphere of corporatism, it can reduce 
the management problem at the moment an EU directives is ready to be implemented.63 
Corporatism is a cooperative relationship between government and interest groups, a 
constellation which is necessary for stability and predictability when EU law is 
implemented. A close and cooperative arrangement between the state and interest groups 
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will improve compliance.64 To conclude, implementation problems can arise when the 
government does not have the adequate, technical and scientific infrastructure to 
implement efficiently EU directives and must undertake major investments to attain the 
necessary mechanisms a EU directive is demanding.65 As the central actor between the 
EU supranational institutions and the various national actors in the implementation and 
compliance of directives, the national governments are indispensable actors both at the 
negotiation and decision upon the content of the EU directive, as well as during its 
subsequent implementation and compliancy process.  
 
3.4 The Bureaucracy in the Member States- (X4)  
With the analysis of the bureaucracy in implementation, the investigation descends again 
to a lower level of analysis. However, closely connected to the previous actor, the 
national governments, the bureaucracy inserts its own dimension in the downloading of 
EU directives into the national administration. Simon Hix clarifies this point in his book. 
He points at the fact that governments are not unitary actors. Within the government, it 
are politicians and bureaucrats that have different interests. Hix states that politicians are 
seeking re-election, where bureaucrats seek more influence over policy outcomes, for 
example through larger budgets or greater freedom to shape their organizational 
structures and policy choices.66 As Steunenberg remarks, administrations can be of big 
influence in the different phases of implementation, ‘National actors responsible for 
implementation may be tempted to claw back what they lost at the summit.’67  
            Until recently politics and administration were two separate domains. In this set up 
administration was the neutral, instrumental and scientific carrying into effect of policies 
chosen by politics. Later research showed that public administration was not the same as 
politics, but was a part of politics and a stage in the policy making process.68 The 
literature is quite in agreement about the fact that legislators on the EU level are often 
unwilling or unable to write detailed, clear, consistent, unambiguous legislation. The fact 
that the national administrations subsequently have to make choices about the policy 
details, makes them relatively influential. An EU directive can be simple, vague or 
incomplete, or even incorporate two different or inconsistent policy goals. This could 
have been done deliberately by the EU governments, because they could not agree on a 
firm policy choice, but wanted anyway to state and get praised for having passed an new 
EU directive.  
          Obviously, under these conditions and with its access to detailed information and 
its skills, the national administration can play an highly important role in the absorption 
of a new EU directive. Shapiro predicts caution about this influence. He states that 
‘everyone knows that it would be a miracle if all Member States administrations were 
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implementing most EU regulations, let alone directives, in even approximately the same 
way.69 That national bureaucracies have their own interest agenda is also confirmed by 
Tallberg who states that an EU rule that require changes in well established 
administrative structures, procedures and practices at the national level meet with 
resistance from bureaucracies with vested interests in existing arrangements. 70 
            The make up of the national administration is of major importance in explaining 
the way the administrations deal with EU directives. Generally, the lower the 
administrative and political capacities of a state and the tighter the timetables for 
implementation are, the higher is the number of non compliance cases and the lower are 
the prospects for a successful transformation of non compliance into compliance during 
the different stages of the European infringement procedure.71 Börzel adds to it that larger 
administrative capacity brings about fewer violations of European law. In order words, 
the composition and size of the national administration does matter for a member states’ 
performance in absorbing EU directives. An important factor inherent to the 
characteristics of the bureaucracy is the lack of financial or personnel resources. Azzi 
states that most member states, especially when they are confronted with an increase in 
the number of directives have to devote extra man-power in a certain policy area.72 When 
this extra man-power or means are not present the absorption will be delayed. The 
implementation and compliance literature shows that the administrative and political 
capacity of the member states and the tightness of timetables for implementation plays an 
important role.  
 
3.5 The interest groups on the Domestic Level- (X5) 
The analysis of the interest groups at the domestic level brings this part of the paper to 
the lowest level of the analysis of the implementation process of EU directives. It might 
be argued that this is a highly important level when it comes to the absorbing of new EU 
directives into a new member states. After all, most EU directive concern private persons, 
the content of these various directives is directly concerning them and affecting their 
lives, in all thinkable respects.  
            More than in the previous X-es under investigation it is necessary to demarcate 
and categorize the actors that can be headed under ‘interest groups on domestic level.’ 
Although it is widely agreed in the EU implementation literature that interest groups are 
very important actors at the end of the policy process, most often interest groups are not 
categorized. That is what will be tried in this chapter. Here, the role of national 
parliaments, national courts and regional governments will be included under this 
heading, as these actors are able to formulate their own preferences at the moment an EU 
directive arrives in the member states.  
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3.5.1 Private Interest Groups on the Domestic Level.  
The Commission states that ‘it is not unusual for a government to succumb to ‘pressures 
from domestic industries who urge it to delay the implementation of EU legislation in 
order to keep their sectors protected for just a little bit longer.’73 The literature however 
also notes another viewpoint on the way the government of a member state will deal with 
domestic interest groups. Some scholars argue that government will most often not bend 
too soon for alternative the preferences of interest groups in the implementation process. 
The stakes for EU governments are high in the application of EU directives, especially 
when the possibility of financial liability in the face of the 1991 ‘Francovich’74 case is 
taking into account.75 These financial consequences make that it is often not very likely 
that governments will give in to interest groups’ demands that it does not share.  
          Tallberg claims that the ambition of the Commission to make the infringement a 
powerful enforcement tool would be doomed to have failed if citizens and companies had 
not made such much use of the complaint procedure. The same might be said from the 
ECJ, it would never have been able to develop the EU’s compliance system if individuals 
had not brought cases and if national courts had not referred cases to the ECJ for 
interpretation. Also Börzel states that the Commission is largely dependent, due to its 
limited resources, on the information from domestic actors in the different stages of the 
implementation process.76  
          Logically, the number of the actors that have the possibility to block political 
decisions will have an important influence on the autonomy of a state to make the 
necessary changes to the status quo for the implementation of EU directives. Here, we 
arrive at the veto player analysis of George Tsebelis.77 It can be expected that the higher 
the number of domestic veto players is during the implementation of an EU directive, the 
higher the probability is that this will slow down the process of legal implementation.  
  
3.5.3 Public interest groups on the domestic level.  
Under this heading we can basically place three important actors. This is firstly the 
national parliament, secondly the national courts and thirdly the local governments. In 
their article Dimitrova and Steunenberg identify a range of public veto players; political 
parties or fractions, parliamentary committees, interest groups and regional and local 
governments.78 To start with the national parliaments it can be concluded that in most 
member states the role of parliaments in implementation is rather weak. The national 
parliament go hardly ever against a government proposal to transpose a particular 
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directive. This can have several reasons, like unfamiliarity with EU legislation, but this 
situation contributes to the so called democratic deficit that characterises the domestic 
dimension of the EU policy process.79 The strict deadlines that go along with 
implementation and the legally binding nature of the directive cause that the role of the 
governments vis-à-vis the parliaments, but also domestic groups, have been strengthened. 
            It can be noted in this respect that according to the literature the number of 
domestic veto players is actually inversely correlated with national compliance records. It 
would make sense to assume that parliamentary involvement to increase implementation 
delay, because the legislative process will then take much longer. Even though, national 
parliaments are rarely involved in the implementation process, it seems that the more the 
parliament is involved, the less delay is associated with this process.80  
          When the national courts are considered, these can be named part of the 
‘decentralized compliance system’, wherein individuals and national courts are active. 
Tallberg states the national courts after complaints of individuals and companies are 
performing the task of a ‘fire alarm’ and monitors state behaviour and clarifies EC law 
and sanctions non-compliance.81 This means that interest groups have manners to 
influence that are stated in the EC Treaty.  
 
Constituting the lowest level of analysis, the influence of domestic interest groups is 
generally more diffuse and covert than the previous actors. As the literature has shown, 
the implementation stage creates for domestic interest groups good opportunities to block 
or veto an EU directives, on which content they did not have a say when it was decided 
upon.  
 
 
3.6 Factors- (Q1) 
One of the concepts introduced in this paper is the distinction in two types of variables 
that have their influence on the implementation stages of an EU directive in an member 
state. Now as the first 5 actors have been analyzed, this chapter will shift the centre of 
attention to the factors of influence in the absorption of EU directives by member states. 
The various factors will be analyzed in one chapter. The factors can roughly be divided in 
two groups, the first on the level of the member state and the second on the level of the 
EU directives. 
 
3.6.1 Member State Level  
Considerable attention in the literature is given to factors that are inherent to the 
institutional set-up of the member state. The core of the argument is that states with a 
federal or regional system, where power rest with Länder (Germany and Austria), regions 
(Belgium and Italy), or autonomous communities (Spain), will have ‘a priori’ a worse 
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implementation record than centralized states.82 In the decentralized states the local 
entities are to some extent responsible for implementation, but in a centralized system the 
state remains legally answerable to the Community institutions. Greater autonomy among 
sub national actors should result in more infringements. Generally, centralized states have 
less difficulty, in contrary to a decentralized, federal system to transpose, implement and 
ensure compliance with an EU directive.83 Haverland states also that the domestic 
political constellation is crucial, as the more institutional veto points, stages in the policy 
process or sub national government layers where the agreement of domestic actors is 
needed, the more problematic implementation will be.84 Veto players85 can be present that 
have objections against a particular EU directive and therefore constrain the capability for 
the domestic institutions to produce change to live upon the demands of the EU directive. 
Government reluctance to implement the appropriate policy changes may not be due to 
lack of will, but rather the result of being held back by domestic veto points. 86  
         In the literature various other factors are mentioned that can influence the 
implementation performance of a member state. Underlying factors can be the economic 
or military power of a member state or the duration of EU membership. The length of 
membership is generally negatively associated with compliance.87 Connected to these 
factors of power, the level of GDP of a member state can be of influence. Firstly, a high 
GDP can lead to high expenditures on administration, which will generally improve its 
implementation performance. Secondly, rich member states may transform their financial 
resources into political weight as they contribute more to the EU’s budget than poor 
states.88 The literature also stresses the factor of population size. The five biggest member 
states (Germany, France, the UK, Italy and Spain) are home to 69 per cent of the 
European population, but account for about 75 per cent of the complaints lodged in the 
last eighteen years.89   
         Another important factor is the level of public support for the European Union in a 
particular Member State. For member state governments it is much easier to implement 
an EU directive when the public support for the EU is high, as governments are always 
watchful to make policy choices that promote re-election. Another factor stressed in the 
literature is the intra-departmental and inter-departmental mobility of officials. Generally, 
mobility is important to keep the management of human recourses in public 
administration efficient. But as Dimitrikapolous notes the movement of officials to other 
posts after the negotiation and adoption of a directive, causes that their experience and 
knowledge are not directly accessible to the officials that replace them.90  In other words, 
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the public administration will in this case not be able to learn from the experiences 
acquired during the negotiations.  
 
3.6.2 Level of the Directive.  
Here, various factors inherent to the content and the formulation of an EU directive are 
discussed. An EU directive can have a high degree of vagueness. A directive that is 
vaguely worded or has ambiguous goals leads to a situation in which implementation is 
not just the technical application of EU legislation, but where important policy choices 
have to be taken. There is generally criticism at the national level that points at the lack of 
precision in EU legislation.91 Falkner shows with 29 empirical cases that inherent legal 
ambiguity of some European Directives may give rise to interpretation problems which 
subsequently have to be clarified by infringement proceedings.92 However, as 
Dimitrakopoulos notes, vagueness is most often not the decisive factor in implementation 
problems; Falkner’s analysis of the case law of the (European) Court shows that a 
relatively small number of cases where the real issue is one of interpretation of a 
secondary Community law in isolation.93  
           The content of a directive also plays a role. Implementation difficulties can rise 
from the impact a directive can have on the national policy. When a directive does not 
simply require the implementation of rules, but asks for active (and expensive) steps to be 
taken, difficulties can arise. For example when the directive introduces a new topic of EU 
regulation or a fundamental revision, the member state will have more difficulty in the 
absorption of an EU directive. Especially EU directives that cause great economic 
consequences, can lead national governments and sub national authorities to have 
concerns about employment and regional development and can therefore be sensitive to 
the calls from firms that have difficulties with the implications of a EU directive. 
         Connected to the content of a directive, Steunenberg takes a more policy specific 
perspective on domestic actors. This perspective pays attention on the fact that 
implementation takes place in various domestic arena’s varying from national lawmaking 
to decision-making within ministries or administrative bodies. Depending on the 
peculiarities of these arena’s domestic actors may react differently to the requirement of 
transposing a directive.94 The last factor discussed here is the timing of European 
policies. When a country in a certain policy area is already putting reforms into place, for 
example the liberalization of the electricity markets, an EU directive in this field with the 
same objective will not cause too much difficulties. If, however, a country has not yet 
started these reforms, the same EU directive will ask close to a ‘transformation’ of the 
specific national policy terrain.   
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IV Empirical Analysis – Directive 
2000/60/EC.  
 
 
his section will apply the actor and factor division as has been set out in the 
previous chapter. Most importantly it will shed light on the discerned underlying 
processes of the actors and the factors in a ‘real world’ empirical situation; the 
implementation of directive 2000/60/EC in both Germany and the Netherlands. It will 
follow the same order of analysis as the previous chapter.  
The environmental directive under investigation in this section is an 
encompassing and important directive that builds a framework for Community action in 
the field of water policy. Its creates a new and integrated governance structure for 
European river basins. The directive is ambitious and technical and therefore the 
preparation and the negotiations for member states on EU level were difficult. However, 
in 2000 a compromise text was achieved. This comprise text received a sceptical 
welcome by some member states.95  But the Commission, the European Parliament and 
many member states were convinced of the value of a directive that would improve the 
environmental quality of EU rivers. Germany and the Netherlands both had great 
difficulties with the implementation of the water framework directive. The European 
Commission started against both member states article 226 EC infringement procedures 
because they were accused of not having implemented significant parts of the directive. 
In the case of Germany, the article 226 EC infringement procedure started with 
the reasoned opinion, which was called the ‘final written warning,’ that it received from 
the Commission at July 16th 2004.96 The European Commission subsequently referred a 
case on February 11th 2005, and Germany was charged with ‘failing to adopt all the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions necessary to give effect to directive 
2000/60/EC.97  
The Netherlands received as well a reasoned opinion on July 16th 2004 and was 
subsequently also taken to the Court on April 1st 2005 and charged with ‘having not taken 
all necessary legal and administrative measures to comply with directive 2000/60/EC.98 
However, the case against the Netherlands was closed without any financial penalties for 
the Netherlands. On November 14th 2005 the Court declared that the European 
Commission had decided by a letter dated on October 14th that the Commission would 
pull back its allegations against the Netherlands, because the latter had meanwhile taken 
the necessary measures to fulfil the remaining implementation obligations.99  
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Germany, on the contrary, was indeed convicted on December 15th 2005 by the 
ECJ. The Court stated that the necessary implementation measures were still not taken 
and Germany was ordered by the Court to bring the implementation of the directive in 
line as rapid as possible.100 The outcomes of the infringement procedure are thus in both 
cases different. This will be analyzed in detail.  
 
4.1 Germany- Implementation of Directive 2000/60/EC 
Commenting on the implementation failure of Germany, the then Environment 
Commissioner Margot Wallström said: ‘Germany, like any other EU member state, must 
implement agreed EU environmental law in full and at the agreed deadlines. I welcome 
the ongoing efforts in Germany, but every delay in meeting the requirements continues to 
put the environment at risk.’101  
Starting with the Commission, the role of the Commission as an source of 
assistance and the decentralized enforcement character of Community law, leaving the 
Commission in a relatively weak position are very much present in the German case 
study. During the implementation stage of the directive the Commission and the member 
states had agreed to work closely together. Central in this approach was the fact that there 
was information sharing, development of guidance on technical issues and information 
and data management from the Commission to Germany.102 These findings do not 
correspond with the critics from the literature research, wherein the Commission is 
sometimes seen as an ‘unhelpful’ source of assistance. In this case the Commission as the 
enforcer was indeed in a relatively weak position because of the decentralized 
enforcement of the directive. The implementation of directive 2000/60/EC in Germany 
was the responsibility of the ‘Bündeslander’, not of the Federal Government.103 Because 
of the limited political legitimization the European Commission has on local domestic 
level, it was not able to enforce the ‘Bündeslander’ directly into compliance., but had to 
address the German federal government instead.  
When the role of the ECJ is observed in the implementation and compliance of 
directive 2000/60/EC, no structural problems have been found in the analysis. It might 
however be argued that the ECJ did not have enough silent power to let Germany put 
extra pressure on its local implementation authorities to avoid legal punishment by the 
ECJ.  
On the level of the national government of Germany the directive demanded 
great legal and behavioural adjustment which contributed to the fact that the German 
government was unable to ensure implementation throughout the country. The directive 
required the implementation of highly technical provisions, but also a thorough 
reorganization of organizations that deal with water policy in Germany.104  
                                                 
100
 EUR Lex, Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften gegen Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Urteil des 
Gerichtshofes, Vertragsverletzung eines Mitgliedstaats – Richtlinie 2000/60/EG. 15. Dezember 2005. 
(Languages; German, French).  
101
 Rapid Press Release July 16th 2004. IP/04/941.  
102
 European Commission working staff document SEC (2007) 362, first stage in the implementation of the 
Water Framework Directive 2000/60/EC. [COM 2007 128 Final] page, 43 and 48-49. 
103
 European Commission working staff document SEC (2007) 362, first stage in the implementation of the 
Water Framework Directive 2000/60/EC. [COM 2007 128 Final] page 63.  
104
 Mitteilung der Kommission an das Europäische Parlament und den Rat. Nachhaltige Wasserbewirtschaftung 
in der Europäischen Union. March 23th 2007. [7768/07] p 2-4. 
 28 
Germany knows traditionally a relatively high degree of corporatism in its 
society and economy.105 However, this degree of corporatism has not been able, as the 
literature would predict, to diminish the management problems that came into existent 
when the comprehensive water policy directive had to be implemented. There has been 
found little evidence of the level op public opinion in Germany for the water policy 
directive. In general the public support in Germany for EU affairs is relatively high106 and 
the effect of the provisions directive were less concentrated on the German citizens 
directly, but most of all on the national bureaucracies. 
The German Lander bureaucracies had to implement the directive and had to put 
into place higher environmental standards, new measuring methods and different 
administrative practices. The German legislative and executive responsibilities for water 
management are divided between federal, state and local authorities107, that all have 
interest in their particular part of the water policy area. The new administrative division 
in river basin governance caused a major shift in concerning ministries of environment in 
the Bündeslander. As the literature predicts, if an EU directive demands changes in well 
established structures, procedures and practices this can meet resistance of national 
bureaucracies that have vested interests in the existing arrangements. In its letter to the 
Commission the German ministry for environment emphasized the sizeable assignments 
that the water policy directive puts upon the bureaucracies of the Bündeslander.108  
Having arrived at the lowest level of analysis, the national interest groups, the 
number of actors involved in the implementation of the water policy directive in 
Germany should be investigated. Specific information about German public involvement 
in the implementation of directive 2000/60/EC is scarce, but several documents conclude 
that while implementing the directive ‘the experience with non-formalised forms of 
interest group consultation or public participation is as a rule very limited.109  
           Moving away from the analysis of the selected actors in this implementation 
analysis, several factors and their applicability can be confirmed in this case study. In the 
literature research it has become clear that large autonomy among sub nationals should 
result in more infringements. Germany is without doubt one of the most decentralized 
member states of the European union. The central problem for Germany was that 
directive 2000/60/EC was not implemented in 5110 of its Bündeslander.111 These 
implementation problems could according to the German government not be attributed to 
the federal government of Germany112, as the implementation of this directive was 
delegated to and under full control of the German Länder. But the Court rejected this 
argument according its settled case-law that a Member State may not plead situations in 
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its internal legal order, including those resulting from its federal organization and 
confirmed the arguments of the Commission.113 In this case the federal structure of 
Germany hampered seriously its implementation results. 
Another factor of importance found here is the fact whether a member state 
possesses an adequate, technical and scientific infrastructure to implement efficiently EU 
directives. As can be recalled, directive 2000/60/EC demands highly far reaching and 
technical changes in terms of national water policy. From the founded evidence, it might 
be argued that in the five Bündeslander that failed to transpose this necessary 
infrastructure was not in place. From these five Bündeslander, four are situated in former 
Eastern Germany. Evidence shows that these Lander have a relatively underdeveloped 
environmental regulation infrastructure in comparing to former West-Germany.114 This 
case confirms the fact that an underdeveloped infrastructure can lead to a higher chance 
on implementation problems. This case study also seems to confirm the validity of the 
factor of population size. Where the 5 biggest member states, with their 69 per cent of the 
EU population, they account for 75 per cent of the infringement procedures. Germany 
being the largest member state, this factor can be confirmed.  
 
4.2 The Netherlands - Implementation of Directive 2000/60/EC 
The analysis is shifted from Germany to the Netherlands, which was also confronted with 
implementation problems concerning directive 2000/60/EC. The then Environment 
Commissioner Stavros Dimas stated: ‘The Netherlands has not implemented the directive 
despite our final warnings last summer. I appreciate that the Netherlands is taking action 
to move towards conformity but its progress is not fast enough. EU legislation contains 
clear deadlines and these have to be respected if we are to deliver the level of 
environmental protection that Europe’s citizens expect from us.’115  
            Also for the Netherlands, on every actor level, processes can be discerned that 
argue in favour or against the conclusion drawn about each actor in the literature 
research. Having in mind the fact that the case against the Netherlands was withdrawn on 
the last moment, it is expected to find different processes in this case study that explain 
the sudden change of the Dutch non-compliance behaviour.  
The mechanisms applied by the Commission seem to have contributed to the fact 
that the infringement procedure against the Netherlands was prematurely closed. 
Evidence has been found that already in the stage between the formal letter and the 
official start of the infringement procedure, the reasoned opinion, the Commission and 
the Netherlands have pursued numerous bilateral meetings to clarify aspects of the water 
policy directive, but most of all to push the Netherlands into compliance. In a letter to the 
Dutch parliament, dated May 25th 2004 the under-secretary for ‘Transport, Public Works 
and Water management’ warns that negotiations between Dutch officials and the 
Commission had been without result and that the Commission was determined to start 
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infringement procedures against the Netherlands.116 Even though the Commission has the 
political powers to condemn member states, it resorts for political reason more often to 
bilateral negotiating. From December 22nd 2003, the date when the period for 
implementing the directive in national law expired, to April 1st, the date when the 
Commission referred a non-implementation case to the ECJ, the Commission tried to 
reach compliance by bilateral negotiations.117 However, this strategy failed in the first 
instance. But by a letter signed on October 14th 2005 the Commission withdrew its 
complaints, as the Netherlands had taken the necessary obligations.  
When the role of the ECJ is observed in the implementation and compliance of 
directive 2000/60/EC, no structural problems have been found in the analysis. This is 
especially caused by the fact that the ECJ referral was prematurely withdrawn, before the 
Court could come in action and make a judgment about the infringements. However, 
from the literature it could be confirmed that the Court has a deterrent function, where 
member states comply before a ECJ judgment has been reached. As has been stated in the 
literature, the far majority, about 90 percent, of the infringement cases end negatively for 
the member state.118  
On the level of the national government of the Netherlands it can be confirmed 
that the more demanding the directive is, the less inclined member states are to comply. 
For the Netherlands the water policy directive means considerable adaptations in its water 
management. Because of the densely populated and therefore intensive land use, it is for 
the Netherlands difficult to live up to specific provisions of the directive.119 The 
prediction that national governments often protect domestic concerns seems to be 
confirmed here. A considerable level of public participation has been reached during the 
implementation. Especially, considerable economic concerns were raised from the 
various Dutch trade and business groups that the strict directive, would lead to a ‘lock’ on 
the economy.120 In contrary to what the literature research predicts, the corporatist 
character of the Netherlands121 has not been strong enough in this case to ensure correct 
implementation with directive 2000/60/EC.  
Moving to the level of bureaucracies, the empirical evidence proves that directive 
2000/60/EC required changes in well established administrative structures, procedures 
and practices at the national level. The directive obliges the Netherlands to change the 
governing of the water quality of its rivers from the provinces to newly created ‘river 
basin authorities.’122 This is only one of the provisions, but it leads to a thorough 
reorganization of water management within the department of water management, an 
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institution that exists already more than 200 years and which has vested bureaucratic 
interests in the traditional governing structure.  
Descending to the lowest actor of analysis in this thesis the interest groups on the 
domestic level are touched upon. In contrary to the case of Germany, where evidence of 
public involvement was relatively scarce, the evidence of strong interest involvement in 
the Dutch implementation case seems to confirm the literature prediction that the 
implementation stage creates good opportunities for domestic interest groups to block or 
veto an EU directive, on which content they did not have a say when it was decided upon. 
Moreover, the number of veto players in the Netherlands was considerable. Interesting is 
that this is not inherent to the Dutch system, which is relatively centralized.  
In its communication the Commission states that for the Netherlands, the 
competent implementation authority is solely the Ministry of Transport, Public Works 
and Water management, whereas for Germany the governments of all the Bündeslander 
are listed.123 Therefore a centralized implementation effort would have been possible for 
the Netherlands, but the Dutch government decided implementation to be on the lowest 
governmental scale as possible124 and to let societal interests have generous opportunities 
to express their views125, the advantage of centralized implementation has thereby been 
annulled, but transparency risen. Even though the business and economic interest groups 
were lobbying the government intensively, afraid as they were that the Water Framework 
Directive 2000/60/EC would hinder their economic activities, no strong direct prove has 
been found that the literature prediction can be confirmed that the Dutch government 
succumbed to domestic pressures which would have caused delays in implementation, 
but it will not have improved the speed of implementation.  
Moving again away from the analysis of the selected actors in this 
implementation analysis, and subsequently basing on the literature research, several 
factors and their applicability can be confirmed in this case study. As one of the 
environmental leaders of the EU member states and a water abundant country, the 
infrastructure was in place to implement directive 2000/60/EC correct and in time. The 
last factor under discussion here, the degree to which a directive inserts a new topic of 
EU regulation, has the most explanatory power. Bringing drastic changes in the water 
management and the cleanness levels of its waters, the Netherlands had difficulty in 
finding a balance between its obligations to the European Union and the strong domestic 
economic interests that feared the Dutch economy would be locked.  
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V The Structural Framework and the 
Implementation of Directives in the EU  
 
 
 
he empirical analysis of the implementation of directive 2000/60/EC in Germany 
and the Netherlands has shown that the framework of studying separately the 
actors and factors of influence in the implementation process is useful. It 
contributes in specifying the problems that the implementation of a complicated 
environmental directive can cause, but most interestingly it is able to discern whether the 
implementation problems can be ascribed to one of the selected actors, factors or a 
combination of both. In this chapter the application of the remaining part of the 
framework will be discussed. It will be attempted to analysis whether the separate 
theoretical concepts are together able to shed light on implementation difficulties. In 
order to do so, the three selected theoretical concepts, the can and will categorization and 
the compliance concepts and their applicability on the results drawn from the previous 
literature and empirical research will be discussed. It will be seen whether the study of 
problems that can surround the implementation process of EU directives can be analyzed 
from a perspective that treats the EU as a federal state. The discussion will follow the 
order of the framework, recall figure 1 on page 5 for a graphical overview of the 
framework, in the end some critics and failures of the framework will be pointed out.  
 
5.2 Theoretical Concepts at the Domestic level – 
implementation failure explained 
 
 
5.2.1 Theoretical Concept #1 ‘Goodness of Fit’ 
The ‘Goodness of fit’ hypothesis was emphasized in many implementation studies during 
the literature research. The hypothesis can be stated to apply to several predictions in 
both the actors and the factors of the literature research. For the national bureaucracy 
actor and the factor that stresses the content of a directive the goodness of fit gives 
theoretical support. In the empirical analysis is has been proved that the specific content 
of a directive, its fit with existing domestic policies in the water policy area, was one of 
the major reasons for the Netherlands to be faced with implementation problems. In the 
case of Germany, another ‘Goodness of fit’ problem was pivotal concerning the directive, 
where on the sub national level it lacked in five Bündeslander the necessary infrastructure 
to comply. The absorption of the goodness of fit hypothesis in the framework proves that 
participation in EU policy making is extremely demanding for Member States. In the 
words of Wright; they’re locked into a ‘continuous policy making process of both an 
active and reactive nature’126 
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5.2.2 Theoretical Concept #2 ‘Communication model of Inter-
Governmental Policy Implementation’ 
 
The selected concepts from federal oriented implementation theory require more 
elaborate discussion as they have far less often been applied on implementation and 
compliance problems in the European Union. Connected to the ‘top down’ character of 
the used framework, the selected ‘communications model of intergovernmental policy 
implementation stresses the communicational interaction between the federal, state and 
local layer of the government. Recall figure 7.3 in the appendix. Having proved that EU 
can be analysed as a federal polity, the Communications model seem to be very much 
complementary to the actor/factor framework. Both in the literature research and in the 
empirical analysis of Germany and the Netherlands is has been proved that member states 
face during the implementation process strong inducements and constraints from both the 
state and local level. Especially in the case of the Netherlands the state decisional 
outcome to not implement correctly was influence by inducements of certain parts of the 
bureaucracy that saw change in the national water policy governance as a threat to its 
bureaucratic interests and a strong pressure from domestic trade and industry that feared a 
standstill of the Dutch economy. Simultaneously, Germany’s implementation endeavours 
were constrained by its decentralized implementation system.  
The Federal level inducements and constraints were in both studied member 
states visible. Firstly, in the form of a complicated environmental directive. A fact that is 
however beyond the scope of this paper, but the chance is present that directive 
2000/60/EC did not suit the preferences of Germany and the Netherlands, as most 
environmental legislation is decided on the basis of qualified majority voting.127 The 
chance to be outvoted is then present. Secondly, strong federal inducements to both the 
Netherlands and Germany flew from the monitoring and controlling function of the 
European Commission, that started in both cases an infringement procedure, which is a 
strong inducement mechanism. The peak in inducement in the EU federal system comes 
from the highest adjudicator, the European Court of Justice. The threat of a conviction by 
the Court and the possibility of subsequent article 228 EC proceedings that can lead to 
considerable fines for a member states did both member states quickly correct their 
implementation irregularities. This applies especially to the case of the Netherlands, that 
quickly after its referral to the Court corrected its implementation deficit. But also in the 
case of Germany were the implementation problems after the conviction of the Court 
quickly solved, to avoid the costly article 228 EC procedure.128  
The Communications model predicts that two intervening variables are of 
influence on the implementation performance of a member state. The structure, personnel 
and financial resources of a state, the organizational capacity, have a large impact on the 
implementation performance of member states, as the literature and empirical research 
shows. In the case of Germany and the Netherlands, the financial resources were of less 
importance, but one might imagine that complicated directives can be put a strain on the 
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financial resources of one of the recently admitted Member States. Less evidence has 
been found in the empirical research of the ecological capacity variables; the state’s 
economic, political and situational capacity. However, the literature predicts that 
variables as the size of a member states or its GDP have statistical consequences for a 
wretched implementation record.  
 
5.2.3 Theoretical concept # 4 ‘Degree of Domestic Change’  
This concept, derived from the Europeanization theory, offers a clear classification of the 
extent to what an EU directive causes domestic change, the most significant aspect of the 
Europeanization literature. In the case of the Netherlands, with a developed policy 
infrastructure in the area of water management, the implementation of directive 
2000/60/EC lead to ‘accommodation.’ The directive could be transposed in existing 
national structures. In the Germany however, the picture is less defined. It might be 
argued that directive 2000/60/EC caused a transformation in the water policy field, 
replacing existing policies, processes and institutions, especially in the five Bündeslander 
that had implementation problems.  
 
5.2.4 Can versus Will Concept  
The in this thesis introduced can and will concept seems to be useful in categorizing the 
problems that Germany and the Netherlands faced. For Germany it might be argued that 
most of its problems had a clear can connotation in that the largest obstacles to correct 
implementation were its federal structure, and connected to this the fact that the 
Commission was not able to enforce directly and through the lack of the right 
infrastructure in particularly the former Eastern German Bündeslander. In the case of the 
Netherlands a far more stronger will component can be found in its implementation 
problems. Having in place a centralized governance structure and the necessary 
infrastructure, it was more lenient towards the societal economic interests which delayed 
the implementation. The premise here is that it is important to differentiate in an early 
stage the character of the implementation problems in can and in will categories. The 
reason for this is that it is highly important for the European Commission and the 
European Court of Justice in the compliance stage of the implementation of an EU 
directive to know whether the implementation problems of a member state were caused 
mainly voluntarily or involuntarily. 
 
 
5.3 Theoretical Concepts at the EU level– ensuring 
compliance with EU directives  
On the basis of the literature and empirical research, in this section a short survey will be 
made of the usefulness of the can and will distinction in the last component of the 
propose framework; the compliance phase. As was noted by Börzel; while the European 
Union has continuously expanded its legislative competencies, the implementation and 
enforcement of European law firmly rests within the responsibility of the member 
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states.129 Both approaches are pointed towards the improvement of compliance to 
European rules by EU member states. 
 
5.3.1 The Enforcement approach 
This approach assumes that the member states of the European Union have defection 
incentives and that states violate voluntarily international norms and rules. The reason is 
that they do not want to bear the costs of compliance. The enforcement approach 
therefore states that compliance problems are best remedied by increasing the likelihood 
and costs of detection through monitory and the threat of sanctions.130 It can be stated that 
in the case of the Netherlands, the problems around the implementation process of 
directive 2000/60/EC had preponderant voluntary causes. The Dutch government made a 
deliberate choice to succumb to domestic pressure, at least no fundamental ‘can’ 
problems have been found. Another factor was the fact that a complicated environmental 
directive has enormous economic consequences for a densely populated country, 
consequences the Dutch government was hesitating to bear. The compliance strategy 
followed by the Commission and the ECJ had in the beginning a strong ‘enforcement’ 
character with the referral to the ECJ and the subsequent outlook on high fines. In the 
middle of the referral process a more ‘management’ character developed from the 
Commission’s side. Intensive bilateral negotiations were pivotal in ensuring compliance 
with the water policy directive, which fits the management approach more that stresses 
the importance of capacity building and rule specification. 
 
5.3.2 The Management approach  
In this approach, non compliance is conceived as a problem of ‘involuntary’ defection. 
Tallberg notes that the management approach assumes that capacity limitations and rule 
ambiguity are the reasons for non-compliance.131 The implementation problems of 
Germany would argue for a management approach in ensuring compliance. Its Federal 
structure and the inadequate water policy infrastructure in five of its member states were 
clearly not directly voluntarily chosen. The Commission could have taken a management 
approach and provide financial and technical assistance.132 However, in this case a clear 
enforcement approach was applied. The Commission, and subsequently the ECJ as well, 
did not accept capacity problems as excuses for implementation problems.133 A more 
enforcement was applied here.  
 
 
 
                                                 
129
 Tanja A. Börzel, guarding the treaty: the compliance strategies of the European Commission. P 197. 
130
 Jonas Tallberg, ‘Paths to compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union,’ in: International 
Organization, Vol. 56, No 3. (2002) p 611.  
131
 Ibidem., p 613.  
132
 Tanja A. Börzel, guarding the treaty: the compliance strategies of the European Commission. p 200.  
133
 Paragraph 3-4, C-67/05 Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften gegen Bundesrepublik Deutschland.  
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5.4 Critics  
 
The proposed framework can also be critized at some points. The framework is far from 
all-encompassing. It lends the insights from several theoretical concepts, but that does of 
course not preclude for the argument that more theoretical concepts could have been 
absorbed, especially more in depth concepts that can be adapted for specific policy areas. 
Moreover, the EU might be studied as a Federal state, it is not yet one. Especially, the 
highly politicized nature of the actions of the Commission and the ECJ in the compliance 
process makes it that in the interchange between the state and federal level of the EU, 
more politics is involved as in the US Federal System. Another critic could be the fact 
that the actor and factor distinction is useful, but that the empirical analysis of directive 
200/60/EC proved that some causes of implementation problems are hard to categorize in 
one actor and constitute simultaneously a factor as well. To conclude, the usage of the 
enforcement and management method has not been confirmed by the empirical research. 
It follows however the conclusion that Tallberg also made, that the two approaches are 
complementary.134 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
134
 Jonas Tallberg, ‘Paths to compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union,’ in: International 
Organization, Vol. 56, No 3. (2002), p 609-610. 
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VI Conclusion  
 
 
ost EU member states are generally very much willing to implement 
directives in time and in a correct manner. However, all member states have 
to deal at times with obstacles that hinder a smooth implementation of a 
directive into the national law. The aim of this thesis was to shed light on this particular 
process of implementation difficulties. On the basis of the preceding analysis an answer 
will be formulated here to the two research questions posted in the introduction.  
          The first aim to develop a structural framework for the analysis of implementation 
problems in the European Union policy process has been attained. The framework was 
introduced in chapter two and subsequently worked out and preliminary tested. As the 
point of departure the framework takes the presumption that in order to investigate 
implementation problems with directives, the European Union can be analysed as a 
federal state. The framework puts centrally the introduction of a division in actors and 
factor. This was a successful tool in analyzing the literature and performing the empirical 
research. It made it possible to discern whether particular implementation problems can 
be ascribed to one of the selected actors, factors or a combination of both. A point of 
critic was that not all implementation problems are easily being categorized under one 
actor or factor. Subsequently, other theoretical concepts from the Europeanization theory 
and Implementation literature were inserted in the model to contribute to explanation of 
the processes surrounding the actor and factor division.  
Firstly, the ‘Goodness of fit’ concept was useful in the empirical research to 
explain for the case of the Netherlands the reasons that it was faced with implementation 
problems. Due to the densely populated and therefore intensive land use, it was for the 
Netherlands difficult to live up to specific provisions of the directive. Secondly, the 
‘Communication Model of Inter-Governmental Policy Implementation’ was able to shed 
light on the interplay between the federal, state and local layer of the government. It 
found prove that the national governments of Germany and the Netherlands faced strong 
inducements and constraints from both the federal and the local (domestic) level during 
the implementation process of directive 2000/60/EC. Thirdly, use was made of the 
categorization in ‘Degrees of Domestic Change.’ Less a explaining concept, it is able to 
categorize the degree of change a directive will cause into the national system. In the case 
of Germany the degree of change varied per Bündesland, on the overall a transformation 
was accomplished, whereas in the case of the Netherlands the implementation of 
directive 2000/60/EC lead to accommodation. Fourthly, an new concept was introduced. 
The distinction between can and will causes of implementation problems. It lead to the 
conclusion that Germany suffered mainly from can problems, principally due to its 
federal governance system and a deficiency of the necessary technical infrastructure in 
some of its Bündeslander, whereas the Netherlands saw more will problems, in that it was 
relatively lenient to domestic trade and business interests. The last stage of the structural 
framework centred again on the European level and focused on the compliance stage of 
the implementation of EU directives. With the insights of the structure of the problems 
and the voluntarily or non-voluntarily character of these problems the European 
M 
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Commission decided its strategy to use a management or a enforcement approach. It has 
been proven that in both instances the Commission applied a combination of the two 
mechanisms. Critics have been given as to the fact whether the Commission should have 
followed a harder enforcement approach towards the Netherlands, and a more 
management approach towards Germany, which suffered mostly from involuntarily 
structural governance problems.  
The objective of developing a structural framework for the analysis of 
implementation problems has been obtained. The discussion of the framework has shown 
that it is able to offer explanatory concepts for the various sorts of problems that can 
accompany the implementation of an EU directive by a member state. Moreover it offers 
explanations for the policy choices of the European Commission and the ECJ during the 
implementation process. Finally, it presents several concepts from the Europeanization 
and Implementation literature that are able to put the discerned implementation problems 
of actors and factors in a wider theoretical context.  
The second research question was to draw a cautious conclusion as to which of 
the actors and factors studied are pivotal in the causes of implementation problems in the 
European Union. The answering of this question flows logically from the establishment, 
discussion and preliminary application of the structural framework and the outcomes of 
the literature and empirical research. The conclusion can here be drawn that in terms of 
compliance of implementation, the European Commission and the National Governments 
are the pivotal actors, but the other three actors are in essential in many instances, 
inherent to the specifications of a certain directive. A clear conclusion cannot be drawn 
solely on the basis of this research. Concerning the factors, it can be concluded that 
especially the constitutional set up of a Member State and the content of a directive are 
often decisive factors hindering or facilitating the implementation of a directive.  
 Regarding the Commission, it can be pivotal in offering technical assistance and 
clarification to the member states during the implementation process. The case of the 
Netherlands confirmed this argument. The principle of decentralized enforcement of 
Community law is a serious contribution to implementation problems, as it leaves the 
Commission in a weak position to ensure correct implementation. The case of Germany 
confirms this, which aggravated the Commission’s weak position even more due to its 
federal system. It can be concluded that the ECJ has no direct stake in implementation 
problems. It has been discussed however that a even larger deterrent working of a Court’s 
judgement would contribute to a better implementation record. The analysis has shown 
that national governments form the linchpin of causes for implementation problems, as 
confirmed by the Communications model. Governments can surrender to domestic 
interests that run contrary to the provisions of a directive. Moreover, the state’s 
substantial interests and preferences might change over time, either because of domestic 
changes or because of environmental changes. This provides incentives for defection and 
for non-compliant action as a consequence. Descending to the national bureaucracies, the 
fact that they often have to make decisions about policy details, make them influential 
and prone to interpret the directive differently, leading to incorrect implementation. 
Moreover, as confirmed in the case of both Germany and the Netherlands, a far reaching 
directive can cause resistance from national level bureaucracies which have vested 
interests in the status quo. On the level of the domestic interest groups the following most 
important causes for implementation problems were discerned in the application of the 
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framework. Domestic interests, in the shape of veto points have been proved to be very 
influential implementation problems. The case of the Netherlands has confirmed this 
clearly. From the analysed factors, the factor stressing the constitutional set up of a 
member state is an important forecaster of implementation problems, as greater autonomy 
for sub-national actors result in more infringements. This is confirmed in the German 
case. The requirement of an adequate technical and scientific infrastructure and the 
content of a directive is the last factor that has been discerned as an significant cause for 
implementation problems, as proved by the implementation difficulties of the studied 
German Bündeslander. 
The purpose of this thesis was to study the dimensions of the moment European 
rules concretely show their repercussion on the domestic sphere of a member state. It was 
attempted to study the behaviour of a full range of public and private actors in this 
process, but in a structured way. During this study it was proven that several theoretic 
insights were useful in enlighten certain aspects of the distinguished characteristics of the 
implementation stage. From this process a framework grew that contains many existing, 
but also newly introduced concepts, that hopes to contribute to a better understanding of 
the implementation process of directives in the European Union.   
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VII Appendices  
 
7.1 Appendix 1 Absorption of Directives by the EU (25)  
Source: The European Commission, scoreboard internal market July 15th 2006.  
 
 
Performance as against the 1.5% transposition deficit interim ceiling.  
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7.2 Appendix 2 The Communications Model of inter- 
governmental Policy Implementation 
Source: Michael Hill and Peter Hupe, Implementing Public Policy (London 2003) p 67.  
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7.3 Appendix 3 Infringement Procedure  
Source: Tanja A. Börzel, ‘Non Compliance in the European Union; Pathology or Statistical 
artefact?’ Journal of Public Policy Vol. 8 (5) (2001) p 807.  
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7.4 Appendix 4 Structural framework for analyzing EU 
directive implementation problems 
Source: own.  
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